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What is the Right 
Energy Policy for America? 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
The rapid rise in gasoline prices following 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has stirred renewed 
interest in the idea that the United States should 
adopt an energy policy. That notion is reen-
forced by the fact that we now import one-half 
of the oil we use, which makes us very vul-
nerable to all sorts of overseas disruptions (see 
Figure 1). 
The sad fact, which few Americans seem to 
remember, is that the United States did have an 
active energy policy in the 1970s. The De-
partment of Energy controlled the price of 
gasoline (and of other fuels) and also allocated 
the supply of gasoline by state and type of user. 
Under the circumstances, there were no short-
ages of governmental rules, directives and 
prohibitions governing the production and use 
of energy. 
The results, to put it kindly, were counter-
productive - widespread fuel shortages and 
long lines at service stations. The contrast with 
Western Europe and Japan was striking. Al-
though both of those regions were far more de-
pendent on imported oil than the United States 
(Japan imports close to 100 percent of its oil 
supply), neither of them experienced the 
inconveniences and problems that American 
motorists suffered during the 1970s. 
The reason was clear. Unlike the United 
States, these other nations did not try to keep 
the domestic price of gasoline below the world-
market level. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. Dependence on Oil Imports 
(Imports as Percentage of Domestic Demand) 
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Source: American Petroleum Institute. 
Unfortunately, consumers in this country 
never made the obvious connection between 
price controls and shortages . Hence, pleas for 
Congress to do something about "price 
gouging" are becoming louder and shriller. 
But, as the Washington Post noted in a recent 
editorial, "The oil shortages of the 1970s and 
the gasoline lines were the result, not of OPEC 
price increases, but of American price con-
trols."! 
Under the circumstances, a brief refresher 
on the fundamental economics of energy would 
seem helpful. The basic concepts are straight-
forward and should be quickly recalled by any-
one who has had a freshman course in eco-
nomics. 
Economics of Energy2 
Two economic relationships are basic to en-
ergy economics. First, people will use more 
gasoline (and other forms of energy) when it is 
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cheaper, and less when it becomes more expen-
sive. Second, those who supply energy will 
produce more at higher prices than at lower 
prices. 
Higher energy prices account 
for about 80 percent of the total 
energy efficiency improvements 
in the United States since 1973. 
The implications of these two statements, 
when we think them through, are compelling. 
Changes in energy prices are an important form 
of information: they provide signals to both 
producers and consumers. After correcting for 
the effects of shifts in the industrial sector, one 
study found that higher energy prices account 
for about 80 percent of the total energy effi-
ciency improvements in the United States since 
1973.3 
The difficulty is, however, that the process 
of adjusting to price changes may not always be 
as rapid as we would like. On the demand side, 
many consumers own heavy "gas guzzling" 
automobiles, and live in houses with little in-
sulation and large glass windows. Even if the 
price of gasoline and fuel oil rises substantially, 
they will still buy about as much as before. 
Thus, in the language of economists, the de-
mand for energy is relatively "inelastic" in the 
short run. 
Energy conservation originally was viewed 
simply as "doing without." Increasingly, how-
ever, it is becoming apparent that, by increas-
ing the efficiency with which we use energy, 
we can produce the same or higher levels of 
goods and services with less energy. Building-
related research, for example, has produced 
more efficient equipment such as the heat-pump 
water heater and the so:id-state ballast for fluo-
rescent lighting. 
Over the longer run, demand for energy is 
more responsive to changes in p::ice. Older and 
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less fuel-efficient cars are traded in for newer 
models that achieve more miles per gallon of 
gas. Homes are better insulated, and builders 
construct houses with fewer expansive "single-
pane" windows. The result is a significant re-
duction in the demand for neating oil and other 
petroleum products. 
On the supply side, the response to price 
movements may also be slow at first. Long 
lead times are required to develop new sources 
of energy. But higher-cost supplies - which 
were ignored at lower prices - become com-
mercially attractive when prices rise high 
enough. The oil price increases of the 1970s 
also helped develop new oil sources outside of 
the United States, especially from Mexico and 
British and Norwegian North Sea fields. Over-
all, non-OPEC production in the non-commu-
nist world surged from 14 million barrels a day 
in 1976 to 23 million in 1985. 
Certainly, historical evidence shows that 
price increases do provide incentives for 
the development of new domestic energy 
supplies. In Sutton and Edwards counties, 
Texas, total gas completions (a measure of 
wells being dug) were raised from less than 10 
to 240 in the period 1968 to 1974 while the 
price of natural gas rose from 14.0 cents per 
million cubic feet to $1.40 per million cubic 
feet. In eastern Ohio, total gas completions 
rose from 200 to 1,400 during the same 
period.4 
The aggregate pattern of supply response in 
terms of oil wells drilled is shown in Figure 2. 
The relationship between prices and supply is 
clear. The number of wells drilled in the 
United States declined while the price of crude 
oil was static (in real terms); drilling expanded 
sharply when the real price level rose. The key 
point is that price changes are the basic mecha-
nism for equilibrating demand and supply. 
Since the price increases that began with the 
OPEC embargo in 1973, the United States as a 
whole has become a muCh less energy-intensive 
society. 
One measure of energy efficiency is the ratio 
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Figure 2 
New Crude Oil Prices and Drilling Activity 
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bor, and American Petroleum Institute. 
of energy use per unit of gross national prod-
uct. This energy/GNP ratio was 27 thousand 
BTUs per GNP dollar (in constant 1982 dol-
lars) in 1949 and virtually the same in 1970 
(Figure 3). Since then, steady improvement in 
energy efficiency produced a nearly continuous 
downward trend to 20 thousand BTUs per dol-
lar in the late 1980s. The rate of improvement 
has fluctuated: there was moderate improve-
ment in the early 1970s, greater improvement 
in the next decade or so as energy prices rose 
sharply, and then a slowing in the rate of im-
provement in the mid-1980s as energy prices 
declined. 
Energy conservation can result from a vari-
ety of behavioral changes. Approximately one-
third of the energy savings during the past 15 
years, according to the Department of Energy, 
stemmed from individuals and businesses using 
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Figure 3 
The Declining Energy/GNP Ratio 
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ex1stmg energy-consuming equipment less in-
tensively (for example, changing normal ther-
mostat settings or reducing automobile trips).s 
The other two-thirds of the savings resulted 
from improvements in energy efficiency, such 
as adding insulation, buying more fuel-efficient 
vehicles, and building more efficient furnaces, 
power generators and other equipment. For 
example, in 1974, the average new car got 14 
miles per gallon (mpg) and trucks 4 mpg. Cur-
rently, auto efficiency is double at 28 mpg, 
while truck efficiency is up 50 percent at 
6 mpg. The newer 757 jet airliner burns 40 
percent less fuel per seat than the plane it re-
placed, the 727.6 
Other efficiency improvements included de-
veloping products and processes thac are less 
energy intensive. For example, structural plas-
tics replaced steel in many uses, glass fibers 
were used instead of copper wire and industrial 
processes were made more energy efficient. 
Changes in the energy/GNP ratio can, over 
time, make significant differences in a coun-
try's energy situation. Consider the conse-
quences if the United States had not improved 
its energy efficiency since 1973, and the en-
ergy/GNP r&tio had remained constant, rather 
than declining substantially. By 1989, it took 
28 percent less energy to produce a given unit 
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of economic activity in the United States than it 
did at the time of the first oil shock. In 1973, 
27,100 BTUs of energy were required, on av-
erage, to produce $1 of GNP. By 1989, the 
BTU requirement per unit of output had de-
clined to 19,600.7 
By 1989, it took 28 percent less 
energy to produce a given unit 
of economic activity in the 
United States than it did in 1973. 
However, energy efficiency cannot be regu-
lated into existence. Past government attempts 
to force energy efficiency beyond economic 
feasibility proved ineffective. One example 
was the Residential Conservation Service, 
which required utilities to conduct home energy 
audits for customers wanting to improve energy 
efficiency. Only 6 percent of customers re-
quested the appraisals, and even fewer followed 
up. Yet program costs of more than $500 mil-
lion were passed on to ratepayers before 
Congress eliminated the program. 
Historical Experience 
It is useful to draw upon earlier experiences 
in order to provide some historical context. 
Over the course of our nation's history, 
the American people have successively shifted 
from relying primarily on one energy source to 
another. The development of new energy 
sources took place with little if any 
governmental intervention. For example, in 
1800, illumination in the United States was 
provided by candles and oil lamps, with fuel for 
the lamps coming from whale oil. Yet whales 
did not become extinct as the demand for 
lighting expanded with a rapidly growing 
population. A very substantial increase did 
occur in the price of whale oil, however, from 
7 
23 cents a gallon in 1832 to $1.45 in 1865. 
Price rises are always painful and unpopu-
lar. But citizens back then did not write to 
their legislators, nor did newspapers castigate 
the "price gougers" of the day. Consumers 
simply switched to cheaper substitutes such as 
coal gas, camphene distilled from vegetable 
oils, and lard oil. 
Changes in consumer 
demand from whale oil to 
kerosene to gasoline did not 
result from an act of Congress 
or a subsidy from the Treasury. 
The major force for change was 
successive movements in the price 
of the different forms of energy. 
In the 1850s, coal oil or kerosene derived 
from coal distillation dominated the market for 
residential lighting. Its success was followed 
by an equally meteoric decline in favor of a 
new fuel that had appeared in the market. 
Petroleum was discovered in 1859 and quickly 
became the favored source for kerosene. As 
crude oil production swelled, its price fell -
from $18 a barrel in early 1860 to 10 cents a 
barrel in late 1861. By 1863, virtually all coal 
refiners had shifted to refining crude oil. Many 
new refineries appeared on the scene although 
gasoline was considered at the time to be 
a waste byproduct. 8 
The changes in consumer demand from 
whale oil to kerosene to gasoline did not result 
from an act of Congress or a subsidy from the 
Treasury. The major force for change was 
successive movements in the price of the 
different forms of energy. As shown in Figure 
4 there have been frequent shifts in the course 
of American history in the relative importance 
of different fuels. In the middle of the nine-
teenth century, wood was the major fuel and 
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Figure 4 
Energy Sources in the United States 
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cries of alarm were sounded from time to time 
about the depletion of our forests. By late in 
the nineteenth century, however, people shifted 
to coal as relative prices changed. The impli-
cations for current policy would seem to 
be clear: The sooner government frees e'lergy 
sources from artificial restraints, the sooner 
new energy sources will become commercially 
competitive. 
In contrast, just consider what might have 
happened if the federal government had adopted 
a formal energy policy in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Some government agency surely would 
have given a grant to a candlemaker to develop 
an improved wick. Another part of the 
bureaucracy would have subsidized carriage 
companies to test high-mileage hay for horses. 
It is unlikely that any stodgy government o~­
cial would have given a grant to a mavenck 
such as Thomas Edison. 
In a very real sense, the United Stat~s d?es 
have an energy policy for the 1990s. It IS sim-
ilar to the clothing policy, the refrigerator pol-
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icy, and soda pop policy! It's called reliance 
on the marketplace and it works better than any 
alternative, hands-on policy. Surely, the failure 
of the multibillion dollar synthetic fuels 
program initiated in the late 1970s reminds us 
of the dangers that arise when the federal gov-
ernment takes too active a role in attempting to 
forcefeed the pace of market adjustments.9 
Interaction with 
Environmental Regulations 
Despite the absence of any formal energy 
policy, many government actions affect the 
availability of energy in powerful ways. To-
day, the United States has by far the most 
comprehensive body of legislation to protect the 
environment of any nation. The interrelation-
ships between energy and environmental poli-
cies are numerous and significant. Often they 
work at unintended cross-purposes. 
For example, virtually every new energy 
project has been delayed via such actions as 
challenges to an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) or legal disputes over the process 
through which the cognizant federal agency has 
considered the environmental aspects or 
whether it has considered all of the aspects 
properly. In several instances - such as the 
Shoreham nuclear power plant in Long Island 
- energy projects have been abandoned even 
after construction has been completed and ap-
proved. 
One major study of the effects of the EIS de-
scribed it as an instrument of "legal and po-
litical warfare." The authors concluded, 
"There can be no doubt that a major effect of 
the EIS requirement has been to give environ-
mental groups a legal and political instrument 
to cancel, delay, or modify development pro-
jects that they oppose. "10 
During the energy "shortages" of the 1970s, 
a task force of the President's Energy Re-
sources Council analyzed the regulatory prob-
lems that would be faced in developing a do-
10 
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mestic synthetic fuel industry. They specifi-
cally evaluated the effects of the environmental 
impact statements (EIS) required by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA). The conclusions of the task force are 
worrisome for the development of any new en-
ergy source, especially when we consider that 
environmental restrictions have increased in the 
years since the report was written: 
... the major uncertainty under NEPA is not 
whether or not the project will be allowed to 
proceed, but rather the length of time it will ?e 
delayed pending the issuance of an EIS that Will 
stand up in court. The cost of such delays 
(construction financing and inflated raw 
materials and labor costs) is an obvious potential 
hazard to any synfuels project. ... 
In summary, the cost and delay occasioned by 
NEPA constitute a substantial disincentive, 
aggravated by the fact that in dealing with new 
processes it is very hard to anticipate what the 
EIS requirements will be and on what grounds 
the EIS may be attacked. The general guidelines 
offered by the Council on Environmental Quality 
(40 CFR Part 1500) provide a drafting 
framework but no assurance of compliance. 
The Presidential Task Force also identified 
14 different and often onerous regulatory con-
straints which would be faced in developing a 
new energy project such as a synthetic fuel fa-
cility: 
• Preparing an environmental impact state-
ment, as required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969. 
• Meeting new source performance standards 
for air quality, under the Clean Air Act. 
• Meeting the hazardous pollutant emission 
standards, under the Clean Air Act. 
• Meeting the state air-quality implementation 
plans required by the Clean Air Act. 
• Obtaining necessary point source discharge 
permits, under the Clean Water Act. 
• Meeting state water quality standards and 
water quality management plans, as pro-
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mulgated under the Clean Water Act. 
• Complying with limitations applicable to 
"underground injections," under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. 
• Complying with the regulation of interstate 
pipeline transmissions, under the Interstate 
Commerce Act. 
• Complying with the prohibition against a 
carrier transporting its own products, under 
the Interstate Commerce Act. 
• Complying with the allocation of railroad 
cars transporting coal, under the Interstate 
Commerce Act. 
• Complying with the regulation of interstate 
transmission of synthetic gas once it is mixed 
with natural gas, under the Natural Gas Act. 
• Obtaining necessary plant and mine leases, 
from the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. 
• Obtaining necessary water allocations, from 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
• Complying with the Coal Mine Health and 
Safety Act. 
The task force's conclusion is noteworthy: 
"In summary, some of these requirements could 
easily hold up or permanently postpone any at-
tempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels 
plant." 11 The more recent difficulties experi-
enced by companies attempting to build and 
operate nuclear as well as conventional power 
plants tend to bear out the task force's concern. 
Surely, a sensible program of regulatory reform 
has an ~mportant role to play in enhancing the 
economtc strength of the United States be it in 
regard to energy, the environment or other ar-
eas of public interest. 
For instance, if Congress votes to allow ex-
ploration and development of the Coastal Plain 
of Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 
the result might be an increase of one-third in 
current U.S. oil reserves. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy estimates that the area contains 
as much as 9.2 billion barrels of economically 
recoverable oii.12 
12 
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Some Final Thoughts 
on Energy Policy 
The development of government policy to-
ward energy has been a perennial matter 
of controversy in the United States. Issues of 
regulation, taxation, budgeting, and national 
security are, at different times, very much 
involved. An effort needs to be made to 
reconcile the important but conflicting concerns 
for energy, the environment, and the economy. 
If the price of gasoline had 
kept up with inflation in the 
1980s, consumption in the 
United States today would be 
nearly 20 percent lower than it is. 
The status quo in public policy affecting en-
ergy is not adequate for the 1990s. The current 
result is that gasoline prices in the United 
States, despite the run-up following the Iraqi in-
vasion of Kuwait, are still, in real terms 
(corrected for inflation), about the same as in 
1973, prior to the huge increases in oil prices 
brought on by OPEC. U.S. gasoline prices are 
the lowest in the industrialized world. The cur-
rent level of approximately $1.35 compares to 
$3.00 in West Germany, $3.50 in the United 
Kingdom, and $4.30 in France. Energy expert 
Philip Verleger, Jr., estimates that if the price 
of gasoline had kept up with inflation in the 
1980s, consumption in the United States today 
would be nearly 20 percent lower than it is.B 
Even more dramatic is the fact that, on aver-
age, each American uses twice as much energy 
as each resident of Japan and West Germany. 
If, by some stretch of the imagination, we could 
bring our energy use down to that of those two 
economic competitors, the United States might 
be able to eliminate its need for imported oil, 
and thus end its reliance on the unstable Middle 
East for a key part of its energy sJpply _14 
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The principles listed below are an effort to 
provide useful guidance in the emerging debate 
on energy policy in the 1990s.I5 
• Market forces should be depended upon to 
balance energy demand and energy supply. 
• Changes in relative prices should be the key 
force determining the source and use of fuels 
and the introduction of new technologies. 
• Energy prices should include the full societal 
costs of energy production and use, including 
the environmental impacts. 
• Decisions on energy and environment 
policies should include careful consideration 
of the benefits and the costs. 
Adhering to these principles is not as much 
fun as yelling at oil company executives every 
time prices rise, whether such actions are cost-
based or not. However, the four principles do 
point the way to a better balance between the 
demand for energy in the United States and the 
supply available to American consumers. 
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